UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-3-2014

Deon v. H&J Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41593

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Deon v. H&J Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41593" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4854.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4854

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TRUDY DEON,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

H&J Inc., d/b/a, BEST WESTERN,
COEUR D' ALENE INN &
CONFERENCE CENTER, Employer,
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST

)
)
)
)

INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety,

~

Claimant-Appellant,

Docket No. 41593
I.e. No. 2007-005950 and 2008-032836

)

Defendants-Respondents,

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

FILED . COpy

)

)
and

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

)
)

MAR ... 3 lUI;
SIIpreme~oI~
Entered<m ATS by

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)
)

APPEAL FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CHAIRMAN THOMAS BASKIN PRESIDING

Stephen Nemec, ISB No. 7591
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684

Joseph Wager, ISB No. 8445
Law Offices of Kent W. Day
P.O. Box 6358
Boise,ID 83707-6358
Telephone: (208) 895-2383
Facsimile: (208) 972-3213

Thomas Callery, ISB No. 2292
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston,ID 83501
Telephone: (208)-746-0453
Facsimile: (208)-746-9553

Attorney for:
Claimant-Appellant

Attorney for:
Defendants-Respondents
Employer-Surety

Attorney for:
Defendant-Respondent
I.S.I.F.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................... .

1

A. Nature of the Case...... ......... ... ......... ......... ...... ...... ...... .........
B. Course of the Proceedings... ........ ............. ... ....................... ....
C. Concise Statement of the Facts... ............. ................................

1
1
5

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL... ............................................................

8

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.......... .......... .......... ....... .... ............. ...

8

IV.

ARGUMENT...... ... .... ..... ... ............ ... ................. ....................

9

A. Introduction.......................................................................

9

V.

B. The Commission improperly found the elements
of collateral estoppel were met............................................ .....
1. Liability of the Employer/Surety was not
decided in the ISIF settlement.............................................
2. The ISIF settlement is not a final judgment on the merits.............

12
16

C. The Commission erred in raising the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel sua sponte on behalf of the employer/surety........ ...

19

D. The Commission violated the Claimant's right to due process... ..... ....

21

E. The Commission erred in refusing to modify
the ISIF settlement agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ...

22

F. The ISIF settlement is void as a matter oflaw
Rendering collateral estoppels inapplicable...................................

24

G. Attorney fees should be awarded on appeal...................................

24

CONCLUSION........................................................................

25

12

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Anderson v City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986) ............................................. 13
Arizona v California, 530 U.S. 392, 120 S.Ct. 2304, (2000) ..................................................... 14
Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc, 103 Idaho 458, 649 P.2d 1214 (1982) ........................................... .l9, 21
Banzhajv. Carnation Co. 104 Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983) ................................................ .23
Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103, Idaho 453, 649 P.2d 1209, (1982) ................................................ 19
Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984) ........................... .3,4
Davidson v. HH Kiem Company, 110 Idaho 758, 778 P.2d 1196, (1986) ..................................... 18
Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 272 P.3d 569, (2012) ................................................ 22
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134,686 P.2d 79 (Ct. App.1984) ........................................... 19
Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 141 P.3d 1099, 143 Idaho 230 (2006) ................................................ .11
Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689,931 P.2d 1207 (1997) ...... 4,12,17,19,25
Jensen v. The Pillsbury Company, 121 Idaho 127,823 P.2d 161 (1992) ........................................ 17
Lethrud v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560,887 P.2d 1067 (1995) .................. .3,7
MA. Crowley Truckingv. Moyers, 140 N.H. 190,665 A.2d 1077, (1995) ..................................... 16
Matthews v. Department ojCorrections, 121 Idaho 680,827 P.2d 693, (1992) ......................................... 23
Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P.3d 455 (2005) ................................ 19
Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008) .............................................. .23
Patterson v. State, Dept. ojHealth & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,256 P.3d 7]8 (20] 1) ......................... 19
Paullv. Preston Theatres Corporation, 63 Idaho 594,124 P.2d 562, (1942) ............................... 19,21
Phinney v. Shoshone Medical Center, 131 Idaho 529, 960 P.2d 1258, (1998) ................................. 20
Rajspic v Nationwide Mutuallns. Co., 104 Idaho 662, 662 P.2d 534, (1983) ................................. 14
Richardson v. Navistar Int'! Transp. Corp., 170 F.3d 1264, (1oth Cir. 1999) ................................. .18
Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls 131 Idaho 99, 952 P.2d 914, (1998) ......................................... 13

ii

Rodriguezv. Dep'to/Correction, l36 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d, 401, (2001) ............................................. 9
Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 644 P. 2d 331, (1982) ................................................................ 23
Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v. Anna Marie Bowling Irrevocable Trust,
410 F.3d 304, (2005) ................................................................................................... 15
Stoddard v. Hagadone Corporation, 147 Idaho 186,207 P.3d 162, (2009) ................................. 12,17
Sundv. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995) ............................................................... 23
Taggv. State o/Idaho, ISIF, 123 Idaho 95,844 P.2d 1345 (1993) .................................. .l1,14,17,25
Utah Delaware Mining Co. v Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930) ........................ 19
Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----,2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014) ..... 8,9,11,14,16,18,19,25
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008, (2009) ..................... 24

Commission Cases:
Sanije Berisha, Claimant, IC 2002-003038, 2012 WL 2118142 (lIC May 30, 2012) ......................... l3
Sherri Troutwine, Claimant, IC 2006,012796, 2009 WL 5850565 (lIC Nov 27,2009) .................... 20,21

Statutes:
Idaho Code §72-201 .................................................................................................... 25
Idaho Code §72-318(2) ................................................................................................. 24
Idaho Code §72-406 .................................................................................................... 10
Idaho Code §72-713 ...... '" ........................................................................................... 22
Idaho Code §72-719(3) ............................................................................................. 22,24
Idaho Code §72-719(4) .................................................................................................. 4
Idaho Code §72-804 .................................................................................................... 25

iii

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim for total and permanent disability benefits stemming from an
industrial accident on October 4, 2008. The accident occurred when Trudy Deon's ("claimant")
right hand became encircled and crushed in an electric auger while clearing a clogged drain in the
kitchen of the Coeur d'Alene Inn & Conference Center ("employer"). Tr., p. 12. At all relevant
times, the employer was insured by Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation ("surety") for
industrial injuries. R. pp. 10-13.
Following a formal hearing on October 16, 2012, the Industrial Commission
("Commission") concluded on May 3, 2013 that the claimant was entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits payable by the surety. R. p. 110. Simultaneously, the Commission also issued a
notice of reconsideration sua sponte on May 3,2013, raising issue of an the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel on behalf of the employer/surety. R. pp. 112-114.
On November 4, 2013, the Commission entered an order on reconsideration determining
that the Claimant was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits payable by the surety
and was instead entitled to an award of $38,612.64 (i.e. 23.92% PPD minus a $2,039.40 PPI
payment). R. pp. 183-184. The Commission reached this result by relying on a settlement with the
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("IS IF") during the pendency of this case as a means to utilize
the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel against the claimant. Id.
B. Course of the Proceedings
On October 4, 2008, the claimant suffered crush type injuries to her right hand in an
industrial accident. R. p. 1. On January 18, 2011, the claimant filed a Complaint relating to the
October 2008 accident alleging entitlement to additional medical/indemnity benefits.
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On

January 28,2011, the employer/surety filed an Answer to the October 2008 accident stating that the
claimant was not entitled to any additional medical/indemnity benefits. R. pp. 10-11. Shortly
thereafter, the employer/surety alleged in discovery responses that claimant's impainnent and/or
disability could relate to a prior industrial accident on February 9, 2007. R. p. 5.
Claimant then filed a Complaint relating to the February 9, 2007, accident on March 29,
2011. R. p. 5. The employer/surety filed an Answer on April 12,2011, claiming that the claimant
was not entitled to any additional medicallindemnity benefits with respect to the February 9, 2007
accident. R. pp. 12-13.
On June 9, 2011, Claimant then filed a Complaint against the ISIF for total and permanent
disability benefits. R. pp.l4-16. The ISIF filed an Answer on June 17, 2011, stating that the
claimant was not entitled to any additional indemnity benefits from the ISIF as a result of the
October 4,2008 accident. R. pp. 21-23.
On July 1,2011, the Commission ordered all the matters referenced above consolidated into
a single proceeding. R. pp. 24-25. On January 12,2012, the Commission set the case for hearing
on October 16, 2012. R. p. 26. On October 2, 2012, the claimant filed her pre-hearing notice of
witnesses, exhibits, and post-hearing depositions.

R. pp. 29-31. On October 5, 2012, the

employer/surety filed a joint supplemental notice of witnesses, exhibits, and post-hearing
depositions. R. pp. 33-35.

On October 9, 2012, the ISIF filed an exchange of exhibits and

disclosure. R. pp. 36-38.
On October 5, 2012, a joint mediation involving all of the parties was conducted
telephonically by Commission mediator Dennis Burks. At the mediation, the ISIF successfully
reached a settlement with the claimant but the employer/surety did not. The case then proceeded to
hearing against the employer/surety with Commission Referee Alan Taylor on October 16, 2012.
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R. p. 50.

Post-hearing briefs were filed and the matter was taken under advisement by the

Commission on December 24,2012. R. p. 50.
Referee Taylor determined in a decision dated April 8, 2013, that the claimant's "right upper
extremity alone renders her totally and permanently disabled." R. p. 77. The Referee relevantly
concluded as a matter of law that the claimant had proven that she was totally and permanently
disabled under the Lethrud test, that apportionment pursuant to I.C. §72-406 was moot, and
apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d
54 (1984) was not appropriate. R. pp. 78-79.
On May 3, 2013, the Commission declined to adopt Referee's Taylor recommendations in
their entirety "due to the Referee's treatment of the vocational opinions offered by Nancy Collins,
Mary Barros-Bailey and Dan Brownell." R. p. 112.

However, the Commission agreed with

Referee Taylor that the claimant had proven that she was totally and permanently disabled under the

Lethrud test, apportionment pursuant to I.e. §72-406 was moot, and apportionment pursuant to
Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) was not
appropriate on May 3,2013. R. p. 110.

Sua sponte, the Commission issued a notice of reconsideration of the May 3, 2013,
conclusions of law, raising the affilmative defense of collateral estoppel on behalf of the
employer/surety based on the settlement with the ISIF as fonnally approved by the Commission on
November 8, 2012. R. pp. 112-126. The Commission ordered a revised simultaneous briefing on
May 30, 2013, regarding the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel with opening briefs due on
June 28, 2013, and reply briefs due on July 19,2013. On June 27, 2013, the employer/surety filed
an opening brief regarding the impact ofthe ISIF settlement on the May 3, 2013 decision. Ex. Add.
Doc. 4. On June 28, 2013, the claimant filed an opening brief. Ex. Add. Doc. 5. On July 18,2013,
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the employer/surety filed a reply brief. Ex. Add. Doc. 6. On July 19, 2013, the claimant filed a
reply brief. Ex. Add. Doc. 7.
Before the Commission had ruled on the notice of reconsideration, the Claimant filed a
motion for modification of the ISIF settlement agreement on July 26, 2013 to clarifY that the
settlement agreement was not intended to have any collateral estoppel effect benefiting the
employer/surety, together with a supporting affidavit.

R. 127-141.

The supporting affidavit

contained an analysis by economist Dr. Torelli documenting the windfall of hundreds of thousands
of dollars that the employer/surety would receive if the ISIF settlement agreement was used to bar
payment ofthe claim for total and permanent disability benefits assessed against the surety. R. 136141. The employer/surety al1d ISIF filed responsive briefing opposing any attempt to modifY the
settlement agreement on August 8, 2013, and August 9, 2013. R. 142-156. The claimant filed a
reply brief on August 14,2013. R. 157-160. On September 27,2013, the Commission issued an
order denying any modification to the ISIF settlement agreement based on its interpretation of I.C.
§72-719(4). R. pp. 161-165.
On November 4, 2013, the Commission entered an order on reconsideration applying the
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel to reduce the award to the claimant from one of total and
permanent disability payable by the surety to an award of $38,612.64 (i.e. 23.92% PPD minus a
$2,039.40 PPI payment) payable by the surety. R. pp. 183-184. The Commission's order on
reconsideration was based on its interpretation of Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity

Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). R. pp. 175-179.
A notice of appeal was filed on November 14, 2013 and a first amended notice of appeal
was filed on November 22,2013. R. pp. 186-198.
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C. Concise Statement of Facts

Trudy Deon was employed as a maintenance worker by the Coeur d'Alene Inn from June
11, 2003, until November 15, 2009. Ex. 28, p. 14. Her duties were summarized in the job site
evaluation ("JSE") performed by Beth Griggs of the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division
("ICRD") as follows:
Repairs and maintains rooms and facilities at motel and convention center. Uses hand and
power tools to change lighting fixtures, unclog and repair plumbing, and repair damages
to rooms. Changes HVAC filters and belts. Performs pool and spa maintenance.
PerfOlms snow removal and outdoor landscaping. Ex. 1, p. 4; See also Ex. 28, pp. 22-29.

On October 4, 2008, the claimant was in the kitchen of the employer working to unplug a drain that
was clogged and flooding the kitchen area. Tr., p. 30, L. 21-23. In the process of cleaning out the
drain, the claimant's right hand became entangled in an electric auger that encircled, twisted, and
crushed her right hand. A co-worker eventually heard her cries for help and unplugged the device
from the wall as a safety switch had been removed from the auger that would have allowed the
claimant to shut off the device. Tr., p. 31, L. 1-14. Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") on
November 3,2008 interpreted the injuries to the right hand as follows:
Impression:
1. Disruption of the A2 pulley system of the fourth digit with palmar bowing of the flexor
tendon and edema surrounding the flexor tendon in this location compatible with focal
tenosynovitis.
2. Partial disruption or strain of the A2 pulley system of the fifth digit with palmar bowing of
the flexor tendon and mild tenosynovitis.
3. Nondisplaced fracture involving the distal aspect of the proximal phalanx of the fifth digit.
Ex. 13, p. 148.
The MRI report was amended on November 13,2008 to read as follows:
Impression:
1. Ligamentous tear and bowing of the flexor tendon in the fourth and fifth digits. This occurs
just proximal to the interphalangeal joint. This is in the region of the proximal volar
plate/check rain ligament and C2 Pulley. The fifth digit tear is partial. The fourth digit tear
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is partial versus complete, with a partial tear favored as the tendon does not bowstring across
the PIP joint.
2. Increased signal adjacent to the radial and ulnar collateral ligaments of the fourth and fifth
PIP joints. No gross disruption, probable sprain.
3. Osseous contusion of the distal aspect of the fifth proximal phalanx. No definitive fracture,
although a nondisplaced fracture cannot be excluded. Followup radiography may be
helpful.
4. Findings discussed with Dr. Mullen. Ex. 13, p. 151.
The claimant consulted with a wide variety of specialists and underwent multiple physical
therapy sessions with a wide variety of providers without substantial improvement over the next
year before being discharged from physical therapy on October 28, 2009. Ex. 20, p. 260. In the
interim, EMGINCV studies on the right upper extremity were interpreted as abnormal by Dr.
Stevens, who concluded on August 19,2009 that:
Her symptoms and examination do suggest an ulnar sensory nerve injury at the wrist
involving both the deep and superficial branches causing hypesthesia within the classic ulnar
pattern and also the dorsum of the hand within the dorsal ulnar cutaneous distribution. I
strongly suspect that this is a compressive injury and likely a single event injury. It is
unclear if there is actually any correctable lesion other than hoping that the sensation will
gradually return with time. It would not be unreasonable to do an exploration but my
suspicion is that there is no "correctable lesion" of the ulnar nerve. Ex. 14, p. 156.
Dr. Stevens subsequently saw the claimant in the context of a medical examination at the request of
the surety and assessed 2% upper extremity impairment. Ex. 14, p. 166. Dr. Stevens stated that
while no restrictions were assessed based on objective matter, he would not be addressing the
claimant subjective work tolerance and provided a full release on November 18, 2009. Ex. 14, p.
167.

The claimant was laid off by her supervisor, Jeff Mills, on behalf of the employer in

November 2009. Mr. Mills testified at his deposition as follows:
A:
Q:
A:

I believe I laid her off in about the 1st of November 2009.
Okay. And why was that?
She was not capable of performing her duties. Ex. 9, p. 98, L. 21-24.

The claimant searched for work without success for approximately six months but was
unsure of what work she would be able to perform as documented in the ICRD file. Ex. 1, pg.
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23. On May 13, 2010, the Social Security Administration declared the claimant disabled and
administrative judge Gene Duncan commented:
The State agency medical consultants' physical assessments are given little weight because
other medical opinions are more consistent with the record as a whole and evidence received
at the hearing level shows that the claimant is more limited than determined by the State
agency consultants. Greater weight has been given to the credible records of treating
sources that have had an on-going relationship with the claimant. The undersigned finds the
residual functional capacity (RFC) indicated above is supported by the totality of the
objective medical findings and other evidence in the record. Ex. 4, p. 38.
Judge Duncan concluded that:
Even if the claimant had the residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work
considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, a finding of "disabled"
would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14. Ex. 4, p. 39.
The claimant filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits against the
employer/surety on January 18, 2011 and against the IS IF on June 9, 2011. R. p. 1 and 14. On
September 16, 2011, the claimant was seen for a functional capacity evaluation ("FCE") at her own
expense because the surety refused to pay for the evaluation despite recommendations from
multiple treating physicians within the chain of referral for such a procedure. See Ex. 15, pp. 189190, Ex. 17, p. 207, R. 109. The FCE report concluded that the claimant would need to secure a
job with "primarily left handed work with a weight load on the right of less than 5# lifting, up to
20# with both hands, minimum repletion, and self paced" if she was to return to the labor force. Ex.
12, p. 147. Vocational expert Dan Brownell concluded that with the claimant's learning disability,
work history, and hand injury, she had incurred a loss of access to 90% of the labor market and
would require a sympathetic employer to access the remaining positions. R. p. 99.
On May 3, 2013, the Commission issued a decision determining that the claimant was an
odd lot worker and totally and permanently disabled as a result of the last industrial accident under
the Lethrud test, rendering apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road

Department, 107 Idaho 109, 118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 (1984) inappropriate. R. p. 108. On May 3,
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2013, the Commission raised the affinnative defense of collateral estoppel sua sponte on behalf of
the employer/surety in a notice of reconsideration and subsequently issued an order on November 4,
2013, detennining that claimant was not entitled to total and pennanent disability benefits. R. 183184.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the Commission err in finding the elements of the collateral estoppel were met?
2. Did the Commission en in raising the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel sua
sponte on behalf of the employer/surety?
3. Did the Commission violate the Claimant's right to due process?
4. Did the Commission err in refusing to modify the ISIF settlement agreement pursuant to
I.C. §72-719(3)?
5. Is the ISIF settlement void as a matter oflaw?
6. Should attorney fees be awarded on appeal?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014), this
court reviewed the standard of review for an appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of
Idaho and stated:
When tlllS Court reviews a decision from tlie Industrial Commission, it exercises free review
over questions of law but reviews questions of fact only to detennine whether substantial
and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128
Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant
evidence wruch a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic
Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). The
Commission's conclusions on the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed
unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,
515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999).
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Whether collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation is a question
of law upon which the court exercises free review. Rodriguez v. Dep 't of Correction, 136 Idaho 90,
92,29 P.3d, 401, 403 (2001).

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Introduction
This appeal asks this court to assess whether the Commission should continue to use the
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel to deny compensation to claimants instead of analyzing a
claim on the merits.
Idaho (2014).

See Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437,

It is noteworthy from the commencement of this action until raised by the

Commission, the employer/surety failed to raise the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. R.
pp. 112-115. The employer/surety specifically waived the affirmative defense of collateral
estoppel by failing to add it as an issue for hearing on October 16, 2012 as set forth in the
hearing transcript below:
REF. TAYLOR:

Thank you, and welcome. The defendants, employer and surety,
are represented by attorney Roger Brown. I note for the record
that the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is not
represented today. I understand, in communication received late
last week, that the ISIF has settled with claimant prior to today,
and I would just like Mr. Nemec to confirm that.

MR.NEMEC:

That is correct. I have not received any of those documents, but
we have reached a settlement on the issues. Tr. pp. 6-7.

REF. TAYLOR:

Okay, based on counsels' comments, it appears that we can delete
issues one (b) and six, one (b) pertaining to TTDs and six
pertaining to the liability of ISIF pursuant to 72-332. Anv further
comments or issues, counsel? (emphasis added).

MR.NEMEC:

I don't believe so.

MR. BROWN:

No, your Honor.
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Tr. p. 10, L. 7-14.
Whether the ISIF settlement agreement could have any collateral estoppel effect was ripe
for adjudication on October 16, 2012. The employer/surety was aware of the settlement with
ISIF prior to the hearing as noted in the hearing transcript above and the employer/surety was
also present at the mediation of the matter on October 5, 2012. Perhaps more importantly, the
employer/surety had approximately 1.5 months following the formal approval of the settlement
to raise or argue this affirmative defense in their post-hearing brief and failed to do so.
To argue that the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel was not npe for
consideration as the Commission suggested in the Notice of Reconsideration is akin to arguing
that apportionment defenses under I.C. §72-406 are not appropriate for review until the
Commission has first held a primary hearing on the issue of PPI, and then a secondary hearing on
apportionment as it relates to PPD. Were that the law, the policy of providing "sure and celiain"
relief to injured workers would devolve into a Byzantine system of hearings that would further
lengthen the time from injury to relief.
While the Notice of Reconsideration states the employer/surety may not have had
"independent knowledge of the tenns and conditions of Claimant's settlement with the ISIF,"
that statement should have had no bearing on the Commission's May 3, 2013 decision. See R. p.
113. Specifically, the Claimant was under no duty to provide the ISIF settlement agreement to
the employer/surety according to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the Judicial Rules of
Practice and Procedure. More importantly, the employer/surety was aware of the ISIF settlement
and a copy was available from from the Commission, Claimant, or the ISIF had they asked for
one.
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From a policy perspective, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has no place in the world of
worker's compensation law because settlement agreements at the Commission are not examined
on the merits, but rather a "best interests" standard.

While the court may reverse the

Commission's earlier decision determining that the claimant is not entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits on a variety of grounds, it should be recognized that Tagg v. State
of Idaho, ISIF, 123 Idaho 95,844 P.2d 1345 (1993) (which held that a third party beneficiary not

named in a settlement agreement was not entitled to utilize the settlement agreement as res
judicata) remains good law.

The confusion sunounding collateral estoppel in industrial cases stems from the attempt
to liken district courts out of which the doctrine arises with the Industrial Commission. By way
of comparison, district courts typically never hear collateral estoppel arguments with respect to
settlement agreements because the consent of the district court is not required for the parties to
settle a case as it is with the Commission. If the cunent case was litigated in district court
instead ofthe Commission, the employer/surety would be unable to obtain any offset for the ISIF
settlement as a matter of law. See Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 141 P.3d 1099, 143 Idaho 230
(2006).
Finally even assuming that the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel could be used in
an industrial case, celiain elements of the five elements test do not exist in the cunent case. In
order to utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case, the Commission modified the test
as they recently did in Vawter. Specifically, the Commission concluded that issues resolved via
settlement satisfied the "actually decided in litigation" element of the test. The Commission also
held and that a single case with multiple interlocutory orders actually contained multiple "final
judgments on the merits" to satisfY the "final judgment on merits" element of the test.
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In cobbling together a new collateral estoppel doctrine specific to industrial claims the
Commission has created increased litigation, a chilling effect on settlement, protracted
proceedings, strained judicial resources, and drastic and far reaching consequences for
settlements that can reaching decades into the future for all parties.

The result is directly

contrary to the purpose of the act which is to provide for "sure and certain relief' to injured
employees. I.C. §72-201.
It is important to recall that utilization of collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense to

avoid reaching a decision on the merits of a case appears to be a recent application of the
doctrine to industrial claims following Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129
Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). If it chooses, this cOUli should clarify that Tagg remains good
law and instmct the Commission to evaluate each claim on the merits, and to refrain from
applying collateral estoppel as a bar to compensation to injured claimants.

1. The Commission improperly found the elements of collateral estoppel were met.

A. Liability of the Employer/Surety was not actually decided in the ISIF settlement.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously
determined in a separate cause of action when:
(l) the party against whom the earlier decision was asselied had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a
final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the
issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Stoddard v.
Hagadone Corporation, 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009) (emphasis added).
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Thus the collateral estoppel doctrine prevents the relitigation of issues actually litigated
and decided in a prior case. Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls 131 Idaho 99,102, 952 P.2d 914,
917 (1998) citing Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183,731 P.2d 171, 178 (1986)
(emphasis added).

Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation,

albeit including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. See Sanije
Berisha, Claimant, Ie 2002-003038, 2012 WL 2118142 (Idaho Ind. Com. May 30, 2012).
Robertson suggests that the most critical clement of the five part test in collateral estoppel
is that the issue must have actually been litigated and decided on the merits in the prior suit. See
Id. at 103.
There are many reasons why a party may choose not to raise an issue, or to contest an
assertion in a patiicular action. The action may involve so small an amount that litigation
of the issue may cost more than the value of the lawsuit. Or the form may be an
inconvenient one in which to produce the necessary evidence or in which to litigate at all.
The interests of conserving judicial resources, of maintaining consistency, and of
avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party are less compelling when the
issue on which preclusion is sought has not actually been litigated before. And if
preclusive effect were given to issues not litigated, the result might be to discourage
compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action would be
narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation. Restatement (Second) of
Judgments§ 27 comment e (1982). Id. (emphasis added).
As further explained in Anderson v City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 182, 731 P.2d 171,177
(1986):
The theory of the use of judgments is not a matter to be lightly dogmatized about; yet it
seems clear that the operation of recognizing it, when produced from another court, in
support of a plaintiff or in defense of a defendant, is upon analysis not at all an
employment of evidence. It is rather the lending of the court's executive aid, on certain
terms, to a claimant or a defendant, without investigation of the merits of fact. 4
Wigmore, Evidence § 1346 (Chadbourn rev.1972) (emphasis added); accord, Note,
Judgments as Evidence, 46 Iowa L.Rev. 400 (1961); J. Weinstein and M. Berger, 4
Weinstein's Evidence para. 803(22) [01] (1984).
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In Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014), the
Commission considered an interlocutory order regarding benefits owed to the claimant as
synonymous with an "actual decision in prior litigation" under the third element of the collateral
estoppel test. The Commission refused to award the claimant the full amount of medical benefits
owed based on a prior interlocutory order which awarded the claimant a smaller amount.

In

reversing the Commission's decision, this court held collateral estoppel did not apply to cases
involving multiple hearings with a single cause of action beause the "prior litigation" element of the
collateral estoppel test was not met. Id. at 10.
In Tagg v. State of Idaho,

ISI}~

123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (1993), the ISIF sought to

use a settlement agreement between the claimant and employer/surety to preclude a subsequent
claim against the ISIF. This court noted that Industrial Commission decisions are final and
conclusive only at to the matters actually considered and adjudicated by the Commission. !d. at
98. This court held that there was no compelling reason to depart from this principle. The court
also held that the settlement agreement between claimant and employer/surety did not act to
preclude a subsequent and previously unadjudicated claim against ISIF for compensation
attributable to a pre-existing condition. Id. In issuing its decision in this case, the Commission
failed to consider the Tagg holding and analysis.
In Rajspic v Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665, 662 P.2d 534, 537 (1983),
this court chose not to apply collateral estoppel to a stipulation from a prior case to a pending
case because the Court was, "fHJesitant to hold in such circumstances that an issue resolved by

stipulation has been litigated or determined for purposes of collateral estoppel."
Commission failed to recognize this directive in applying collateral estoppel in this case.
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The

The Supreme Court of the United States commented on whether collateral estoppel
should apply to stipulated or consent judgments in Arizona v California, 530 U.S. 392,414, 120
S.Ct. 2304, 2319 (2000) as follows:
But settlements ordinarily occasion no issue preclusion, (sometimes called collateral
estoppel), unless it is clear, as it is not here, that the parties intend their agreement to have
such an effect. "In most circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements
ordinarily are intended to preclude fmiher litigation on the claim presented but are not
intended to preclude further litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus consent
judgments ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion." 18 Charles
Alan Wright, Arther R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§4443, pp. 384-385 (1981). This differentiation is grounded in basic res judicata
doctrine. It is the general rule that issue preclusion attaches only "[w]hen an issue of fact
or law is actually litigated and detelmined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment." Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27, p.
250 (1982). "In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default,
none of the issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section [describing
issue preclusion's domain] does not apply to any issue in a subsequent action." Id.,
comment eat 257 (emphasis added).
Thus, to be given preclusive effect, the issue must have been "actually litigated, squarely
addressed and specifically decided." Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v. Anna Marie

Bowling Irrevocable Trust, 410 F.3d 304,312 (2005). "An issue is not actually litigated if, for
example, there has been a default, a confession of liability, a failure to place a matter in issue by
proper pleading or even because of a stipulation (Restatement [Second] of Judgments §27
comments d, e, at 255-257 (emphasis added); see also, Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285,441
N.Y.S.2d 49,423 N.E.2d 807, supra). Katifman v. Eli Lilly and Company, 65 N.Y.2d 449,482
N.E.2d 63, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, (1985).

Where an issue is uncontested, such as an ooderlying

point in a settlement agreement, the issue was not actually litigated in the prior proceeding and
therefore is not precluded from a subsequent one.

Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v.

Anna Marie Bowling Irrevocable Trust, 410 F.3d 304, 312 (2005).
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Applying these principles to a worker's compensation claim in which the claimant sought
to challenge the Board's failure to give preclusive effect to an earlier lump sum settlement, a
New Hampshire court noted, "[ cJollateral estoppel may be invoked to preclude reconsideration
of an issue only when the issue has been actually litigated. Where ... the final judgment ... was
based on a stipulation of settlement, the issue asserted for preclusion was not actually litigated."
MA. Crowley Trucking v. Moyers, 140 N.H. 190, 195, 665 A.2d 1077, 1080 (1995) (citations

omitted). Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply to any issues conceded in the lump sum
settlement. Appeal of Hooker, 142 N.H. 40,46, 694 A.2d 984,988 (1997) (emphasis added).
In the pending appeal as in the recent Vawter decision, it was improper for the
Commission to apply collateral estoppel where was a single cause of action and all of the
settlements/orders were part of the same case. See Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d---,2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014). Even if there were multiple cases, this court should clarify
that a settlement in an industrial case is not synonymous with deciding a case on the merits. In
this case, the claimant never actually litigated the ultimate issue of employer/surety liability and
ISIF liability until it was detennined on May 3, 2013, that the employer/surety was 100% liable.
The fact that the Commission found the employer/surety 100% liable in this case is ipso facto
proof that the Commission did not previously litigate/decide this issue in the ISIF settlement.
ISIF liability was arrived at through stipulation in the settlement agreement in between the
claimant and ISIF. Thus just as the comi did in Rajspic, this court should decline to hold that an
issue resolved by stipulation has been litigated or detennined for purposes of collateral estoppel.
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B.}

The ISIF settlement is not afinaljudgment on the merits

The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously
detelTIlined in a separate cause of action when:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final
judgment on the merits the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue
is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Stoddard v. Hagadone
Corporation, 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009).
This five-part test originated in district court cases and is believed to have been successfully
applied to a worker's compensation case post-Tagg in Jackman v. State of Idaho, Irzdustrial
Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689,951 P.2d 1207 (1997). In Jackman, the court held that a

settlement with the employer/surety precluded a claim brought against the ISIF on the basis of
collateral estoppel.

Prior to Jackman, it is not believed that a settlement with the

employer/surety had been used to preclude a claim against the ISIF using the affilTIlative defense
of collateral estoppeL See, Tagg v State of Idaho, ISIF, 123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (1993).
The application of collateral estoppel in an industrial case is troubling as Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(a) defines a final judgment as one which has been entered on all claims of
relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. This court has
previously held that Commission decisions which reserve jurisdiction for any reason, such as the
determination of additional damages, are not final decisions/judgments of the Commission for
purposes of appeal. See Jensen v. The Pillsbury Company, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992).
Thus, there is a clear distinction between an interlocutory decision and a final judgment on the
merits in a Commission case.
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In Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014), the
Commission attempted to equate an interlocutory order awarding medical benefits with a final
judgment on the merits despite the fact that additional hearings were being held and no final,
appealable order had been entered. In reversing the Commission's legal conclusion that collateral
estoppel could apply, this court held:
The Commission's 2010 order awarding medical benefits was not a final order, but rather,
an interlocutory order that was subject to modification until such time as a final appealable
order was entered. Thus, the Commission's decision to apply collateral estoppel was in
error. For that reason, Vawter is entitled to recover all of his medical expenses, as initially
provided by the Commission in its 12-5-12 Order. Id. at 10.
Another clear illustration of the failure to obtain a final judgment with respect to
collateral estoppel is seen in Richardson v. Navistar int '[ Transp. Corp., 170 F.3d 1264, (10th
Cir. 1999). In that case, the plaintiffs settled with the original defendants in an action following
trial where a jury verdict allocated 100% of the fault between the original defendants and the
plaintiff, but before entry of a final judgment. The plaintiffs then filed a second lawsuit against a
different group of defendants not named in the first suit who raised the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel. The Utah Supreme Court held that even though liability had previously been
determined in the prior case, because a final judgment had never been entered, the jury verdict
did not bind any party or the court.
With respect to the approval of a settlement agreement, it is apparent that the decision to
approve or disapprove of the compensation is the final "decision" or interlocutory award of the
Commission and it is not a decision on the merits. See Davidson v. HH Kiem Company, 110
Idaho 758, 760, 778 P.2d 1196, 1198 (1986). In a typical case, the procedure for approval of a
lump sum settlement agreement (LSSA) is as follows:
When an LSSA is presented to the Commission, it may approve or deny the settlement
based on the "best interests of all parties." I.C. §72-404; l.R.P. XVIII(B). The
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Commission's Rule XVIII(C) gives a short list of all the documentation an LSSA
submission is expected to contain. If the LSSA is approved, that ends the matter. If it is
denied, the Commission may request additional information, or the Commission or either
party may "schedule a hearing limited to the issue of whether the lump sum settlement ...
is for the best interests of all parties." l.R.P. XVIII(D). The Commission's intemal rules
state that "[t]here is no appeal from the Commission's decision" regarding approval or
denial of an LSSA. Id. If the Commission denies the settlement agreement at the
hearing, a claimant may leave the LSSA behind and request a final hearing on the
merits. (emphasis added). ())1 sley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106
P.3d 455 (2005).
J

Applying the rationale from Jackman to the current industrial case as the Commission did
is flawed as the settlement agreement with the ISIF did not end the litigation in this case as it did
in Jackman and was thus not a final judgment on the merits.

In Jackman, the Claimant had

settled with the employer/surety four years before he ever brought his claim against the ISIF in a
separate case-a different set of facts from those currently before the court where the settlement
with the ISIF was merely an interlocutory order prior to the final judgment on the merits on May
3, 2013. Vawter's holding has clarified that interlocutory orders cannot be used for purposes of
collateral estoppel. To the extent that Jackman is now in conflict with Vawter and Tagg, it
should be overruled.
2. The Commission erred in raising the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel
sua sponte on behalf of the employer/surety.

This court has held on numerous occasions that affirmative defenses such as collateral
estoppel must be plead prior to the trial of a matter or they are waived. Patterson v. State, Dept.
of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 256 P.3d 718 (2011); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103, Idaho

453, 456, 649 P.2d 1209,1212 (1982); See also LR.C.P. 8(c). Failure to raise an affirmative
defense ordinarily results in a waiver of the defense. Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134,
686 P.2d 79 (Ct. App.l984). In the industrial case Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc, 103 Idaho 458,649
P.2d 1214 (1982), this court held the burden to raise the issue of apportionment with respect to
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disability benefits rested with the defense and the failure to raise apportionment at hearing
rendered any review by the Supreme COUli inappropriate. In the industrial case Paull v. Preston
Theatres Corporation, 63 Idaho 594, 124 P.2d 562, (1942), the defendants attempted to raise an
affirmative defense after a hearing on the merits. In refusing such relief this court cited with
approval Utah Delaware Mining Co. v Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930),
which commented on the duty to raise affirmative defenses with greater clarity, holding:
The general rule is that a party can rely on the statute of limitations only where he pleads
it and ordinarily is required to interpose the plea at his first opportunity. Generally, new
trials or rehearings are
to give a defeated party an opportunity to interpose
the statute of limitations where he theretofore and before an adjudication on merits had
full opportunity to interpose it. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
Recently, the Commission stated that, "It is the obligation of the parties to indicate what the
disputed issues are for hearing. See Phinney v. Shoshone Medical Center, 131 Idaho 529, 532,
960 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1998). The Commission cannot decide issues that are not before it."
Sherri Troutwine, Claimant, IC 2006,012796, 2009 WL 5850565 (Idaho Ind. Com. November
27,2009).
In this case, the Answer filed by the employer/surety on January 28, 2011 failed to list
collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense. R. pp. 10-11. Despite having knowledge that the
claimant had settled with the ISIF at mediation and had invoked ISIF liability in a total and
pennanent disability claim, the employer/surety failed to raise this defense at the hearing of this
matter or at anytime thereafter. Indeed, the employer/surety has yet to properly amend their
Answer in this matter. The employer/surety failed to raise collateral estoppel in post-hearing
briefing. As the employer/surety's post-hearing brief was not due until December 17, 2012,
employer/surety clearly had ample opportunity to argue whether the ISIF settlement could have
had collateral estoppel effect. Because the Claimant consistently argued for total and permanent
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disability and invoked ISIF liability long before defendant's brief was due, a definitive issue
involving concrete facts with respect to an apportionment defense could have easily been
adjudicated by Referee Taylor who took this claim under advisement on December 24, 2012,
prior to the formal adjudication on the merits on May 3,2013.
\Vhen the defendants failed to raise the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel or even
address the Carey formula issue in their briefing, just as in Baldner and Paull, the claimant in
this case was entitled to rely upon the finality of the adjudication on May 3, 2013. Given that the
employer/surety viewed this claim as one involving less than total disability according to their
arguments and briefing throughout this litigation, it appears that the employer/surety made a
tactical decision to avoid raising the collateral estoppel defense. Raising such a defense would
have suggested that the employer/surety contemplated liability for a total and permanent
disability claim, a proposition that defendants chose to vigorously contest over several years of
litigation. To raise collateral estoppel as a defense would have placed the employer/surety at a
heightened risk for an award of the claimant's attorney fees for the failure to pay any disability
benefits following the payment of the PPI award in 2009 to present day.
Finally, it is not the Commission's function to serve as trial strategist for any litigant. In
this case, the Commission acted in direct contravention of Trounvine in which the Commission
concluded it "cannot decide issues that are not before it." Sherri Troutwine, Claimant, IC
2006,012796, 2009 WL 5850565 (Idaho Ind. Com. November 27, 2009).

In raising the

affirmative defense of collateral estoppel that the employer/surety waived at hearing after
approving the ISIF settlement, the Commission created the perfect procedural booby trap. See
Tr. p. 10 L. 7-14. The Commission's advocacy for the employer/surety has essentially changed
an award of lifetime disability benefits into a claim worth exactly $108,612.64. R. pp. 183-184.
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3. The Commission violated the Claimant's right to due process.

This Court has held that administrative tribunals are unable to raise issues without first
serving an affected party with "fair notice" and a "full opportunity" to meet such issues. Gomez
v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 272 P.3d 569, 573 (2012). Pursuant to the codification

of that rule in I.C.§72-713, the Commission is required to give the parties at least ten (10) days
notice of the issues to be decided at hearing unless the parties stipulate otherwise 1•

This

procedure allows the parties' to easily modify the issues to provide a meaningful hearing of the
relevant issues on the merits.
In this patiicular case, employer/surety did not request that the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel be included in the notice of hearing, at the hearing, or anytime after the
hearing until prompted to do so at the urging of the Commission following the entry of a
favorable decision for the claimant. As such, the claimant was prejudiced by this late notice.
Had proper notice been provided, the claimant would have conducted the prosecution of this
claim in a different manner. If the employer/surety had stated at hearing that collateral estoppel
would be argued based on the settlement with the ISIF, the claimant could have simply refused
to endorse the settlement and avoided this procedural morass. By interjecting the affirmative
defense into these proceedings following an adjudication by the Commission, the Conmlission
has prejudiced the claimant's rights.
4. The Commission erred in refusing to modify the ISIF settlement agreement.

Idaho Code provides for the modification of a settlement agreement approved by the
Industrial Commission by means ofI.C. §72-719(3). See Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho, 9,12,644
P. 2d 331,334 (1982). Specifically, I.C. §72-719(3) states as follows:
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date of
1

A stipulation or mutual agreement to modifY the issues on the day of hearing is common at the Commission
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accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, may
review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice. Id.

"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or recognized at once
by the mind; not obscure; obvious. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. Sines v.
Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 13, 644 P. 2d 331, 335 (1982). "Injustice" has been defined to mean:
absence of justice, violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust act
or deed; wrong. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. Id.
In the context of workers' compensation, an example of a manifestly unjust decision
would be one that deprives a claimant of benefits that she is obviously entitled to receive. The
court has held that the Commission may review any order to correct a manifest injustice, even
when a purported manifest injustice is brought to the Commission's attention by either party or a
third party. Page v. NleCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). Specifically, the
court has previously held that settlement agreements may be modified to correct a manifest
injustice in Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008); Sund v. Gambrel,
127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995); Matthews v. Department o/Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 827
P.2d 693, (1992); Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 644 P. 2d 331 (1982); and Banzha/ v. Carnation
Co. 104 Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983).
In this case, the employer/surety will owe the Claimant approximately $77,629.28 in total
permanent disability benefits [or the period of time from November 18, 2009 thru January 1,
2015 2 . R. 138-141. If the court determines that the Commission was correct in detennining that
the ISIF settlement agreement had a collateral estoppel impact limiting the amount that the
employer/surety owes, the end result will be a windfall profit of over $500,000.00 to the
employer/surety on a claim where the Commission initially found the employer/surety liable for

2

It is estimated that the court may issue a decision in early 2015
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lifetime disability benefits. R. 138-141.
The employer/surety has not provided any consideration to the claimant for the windfall
they seek to obtain and the claimant never intended to provide the surety with a release of
liability when she signed the ISIF settlement agreement. Should the court accept the untimely
affirmative defense raised by the employer/surety following an adjudication on the merits on
May 3,2013, the claimant will be left to spend the rest of her life subsisting on a net income of
$820.40/month in Social Security benefits. Ex. 2, p. 26. This is precisely the type of situation

I.e. §72-719(3) was created to remedy. As such, it is respectfully requested that the court direct
the Commission to add language to the ISIF settlement agreement clarifying that the settlement
agreement was not intended to have a collateral estoppel effect benefitting the employer/surety if
collateral estoppel is even deemed to be an applicable defense.

5. The ISIF settlement is void as a matter of law.
I.e. §72-318(2) states that, "No agreement by an employee to Waive his rights to
compensation under this act shall be valid." I.C. §72-318(2) must be interpreted to prohibit all
agreements that waive an employee's rights to compensation under the Act. Wernecke v. St. Maries

Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 283, 207 P.3d 1008, 1014 (2009). In this case, the
Commission's order on reconsideration has construed the ISIF settlement agreement as a waiver of
her right to total and pennanent disability benefits paid by the employer/surety as determined in the
May 3, 2013 order. R. p. 110. Additionally, the May 3, 2013, order determined that the ISIF had
no liability in the current matter when the claim was examined on the merits. R. p. 110. As was
stated in Wernecke, if the ISIF settlement agreement is void, there can be no basis for imposing'
collateral estoppel because there is no valid fmaljudgment. Id. at 289.
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6.

Attorney fees should be awarded on appeal

Attorney fees are awarded on appeal in an industrial case if the court determines that the
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee without
reasonable grounds pursuant to I.C. §72-804. In this particular case, the employer/surety has raised
the same tired arguments regarding collateral estoppel as a means to avoid compensating the
claimant as this court recently found wanting in Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., --- P.3d ----,
2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014). In reviewing Vawter, the undersigned is unable to appreciate any
discernible difference in the arguments put forward by the employer/surety in that case and the
arguments put forward by the employer/surety in this case. As such, the arguments now being
advanced by the surety have previously been determined to be without merit.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is the policy of worker's compensation statutes to encourage "sure and certain relief for

injured workers." I.e. §72-201. It should not be the policy of the Industrial Commission to use
settlement agreements to avoid deciding a claim on its merits.

To the extent that Jackman

conflicts with this policy, Jackman should be ovelTuled as it conflicts with the courts well
reasoned holdings in Tagg and Vawter.
Based on the argument presented herein, the Commission's prior detelmination that
collateral estoppel is applicable should be reversed and the case remanded back to the
Commission so that the May 3, 2013 order assessing total and permanent disability benefits
against the surety is reinstated.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTTED this 28 th day of February, 2014.
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